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First considerations 
This study addresses perversion in the clinic and 
in the social field, considering the clinic as a research area 
through which we can have access to social phenomena 
and to dominant discourses. For this study, we have read 
texts from two major authors of psychoanalysis and, more 
particularly, in the field of perversion: Contardo Calligaris 
and Edilene Queiroz. We began with the assumption that 
one reading always takes us to other readings and other 
associations, as we can infer from an expression by Roland 
Barthes “lifting the head as we read” (Barthes, 1988, 
p. 40). Throughout the reading of these texts, we associated 
perversion with some aspects verified in the work with 
witnesses in the Witness Protection Program (Provita).
The relevance of conducting a study on perversion 
is justified by considering what Queiroz (2004) stresses 
when she says that, during the 100 years of psychoanalysis, 
much was produced about neurosis and psychosis, while 
perversion was in a kind of limbo, with little literature 
regarding its clinic. However, in recent decades, we see 
a change in this scenario, as the theme of perversion has 
been a subject for discussions in academic research (theses, 
dissertations, scientific articles) as well as at conferences 
and meetings. According to the author, the current interest 
attests changes in the contemporary social field, as it 
establishes the “emergence of new forms of symptoms 
related to the clinical picture, while, at the same time, it 
reveals an effort to organize knowledge on the specificity 
of perversion and its clinic” (Queiroz, 2004, p. 15).
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Phenomenological clinic versus  
structural clinic 
Contardo Calligaris wrote his doctoral thesis on 
perversion as a social pathology. At a conference held in 
Bahia, in 1986, he spoke about perversion from a social 
point of view. The question that guided his presentation 
was: could perversion be a form of social bonding? To 
answer this question, he starts by saying that the way we 
habitually speak of perversion from a phenomenology 
that is considered, by him, to be unacceptable: the pheno­
menology of so­called deviant sexual conduct. He subse­
quently explains why this phenomenology would be 
unacceptable by listing two sets of reasons.
The first reason would be epistemological, because 
the catalog of so­called sexual perversions (sadism, maso­
chism, voyeurism etc.) was established by the canon 
law, which was its legacy for medicine, at the beginning 
of the 19th century, that is, when the modern law, the 
Napoleonic Code, ceased to be interested in people’s 
private lives. Therefore, a clinical practice may not justify 
a set of phenomena that are gathered by a moral criticism 
(Calligaris, 1986).
He then approaches the second set of reasons, 
which would be more psychoanalytical. Given that the 
psychoanalytic clinic is a structural clinic and that it is 
founded on transference, it is not based on an objective 
phenomena but rather directly in the clinical structure. 
Thus, diagnoses are not made based on basic phenomena, 
but on the way transference occurs. According to him, we 
cannot make a diagnosis of perversion based on sexual 
conduct (Calligaris, 1986).
Psicologia USP   I   www.scielo.br/pusp6
Juliana Falcão Barbosa & Charles Elias Lang
6
Calligaris (1986) then describes how a perverse 
person behaves in transference. The perverse always 
behaves in two ways: the first is within the realms of 
complicity, from the position of the instrument and know­
ledge – he speaks with the analyst as if that was the other 
place, as if he was with him in the same phantasm. The 
second way is the challenge – in this case he speaks as if 
the analyst was the Other, but in the challenge, because 
if the analyst is the Other, he (the patient) is the one who 
knows how to make him experience jouissance.
Edilene Queiroz devoted herself to an extensive 
clinical research project on the perverse discourse, which 
resulted in the book A clínica da perversão (2004). In 
this book, the author also discusses perversion regarding 
transference in the clinic, from the point of view of the analyst­
analysand relationship, focusing on the characteristics 
of the patient’s discourse. We know that transference 
allows, in the clinic, a more intense appearance than what 
occurs in the social field. Transference is understood as 
the reissuance of certain patterns of relationship. Queiroz 
(2004) refers to the perverse discourse – and not only to 
the discourse of the perverse people – and takes “a kind 
of discourse produced by subjects who exhibit perverse 
traits” (p. 18) as a reference. When talking about the 
characteristics of this discourse, she discusses some points 
that converge with those exposed by Calligaris.
Queiroz, when talking about one of her patients, 
says the he complained constantly about the analyst­
analysand relationship, defined by him as authoritarian 
and uneven, causing him to try and change seats, which 
led to an impasse. “To remain in the relationship with 
the other, the perverse person almost always requires the 
establishment of pacts and complicity” (Queiroz, 2004, 
p. 66, our emphasis).
Thus, for both Calligaris and Queiroz, the diagnosis 
of perversion, in a clinic founded on transference, is based 
on discourse, the way someone treats the analyst and the 
place in which the former places the latter when talking to 
him/her. In psychoanalysis, discourse refers to the place 
from where the analysand speaks and the game he plays. In 
this sense, Calligaris (1986) stresses that the diagnosis of 
perversion can be made when this place is one of complicity 
or challenge, when this type of complicity or challenge is 
the decisive way to talk for the subject.
Many authors elect the challenge as a distinctive 
aspect of the perverse discourse. What the formulations of 
Calligaris and Queiroz have in common is the presence of a 
double movement in the way the perverse person addresses 
the analyst: the attempt to challenge him and, at the same 
time, make a pact with him. Joël Dor, when talking about 
perversion, says that the father’s phallic attribution, which 
gives him the Symbolic Father authority (representative of 
the law) will never be recognized, in the perverse structure, 
except to be relentlessly challenged. Hence the mechanism, 
unable to be overcome, of two structural stereotypes that 
work regularly in the perversions: the challenge and the 
transgression (Dor, 1991).
Until now, we have only talked about perversion as 
a structure and as a trace of discourse. However, Calligaris 
proposes another possibility to address the issue of per­
version. In the text of his conference, in 1986, he states 
that what interests him the most regarding the issue of 
perversions is not so much the perverse structure, which is 
unusual, but rather the ease with which the neurotic person 
is taken in perverse formations. For Calligaris, the perverse 
formation is the center of our social life, of the social life of 
a neurotic person. This author complements this by saying 
that every neurotic person dreams of being perverse. A 
person dreams of being perverse because the neurotic 
position is very unsatisfactory, and he (the neurotic person) 
is ready to accept almost anything to join the perverse 
assembly, to reach an easier mode of jouissance.
Five years later, on the same line of formulations 
presented in the conference of 1986, Calligaris published 
an essay titled “A sedução totalitária” (1991) in the book 
Clínica do Social. This book is a publication from O Sexto 
Lobo and consists of a collection of different authors who 
discuss about aspects of the clinic in social life. Calligaris 
says that the purpose of this project is to “create the 
conditions for a multi­disciplinary dialogue for those who 
try to discursively intervene today in the social symptom 
according to a set of ethics consistent with the ethics of 
psychoanalysis” (Calligaris, 1991, p. 12).
The neurosis exit through perversion 
In “A sedução totalitária”, we can see Calligaris’ 
position in the first paragraph. He intends to treat perversion 
as a social and not a sexual pathology. As we have seen, 
he addressed this same issue in the conference of 1986, 
but in this new text he intends to go forward. Regarding 
this advancement that Calligaris anticipates, we realize 
that he took a specific point mentioned at the conference 
and developed it in more detail, which resulted in a very 
interesting and dense, but very clear, text concerning 
his theses on the “passion of being an instrument”, and 
“perverse exit of the neurosis” (Calligaris, 1991, pp. 112­111).
To illustrate his ideas, he uses the example of 
Albert Speer, Hitler’s first architect and Reich Minister 
of Armaments, who directed, in the final years of the 
Second World War, the German industrial and military 
effort. During the years he spent in prison, Speer wrote 
a kind of political autobiography, in an attempt to defend 
himself at the Nuremberg trials (1945­1946). In these 
writings he tries to clarify how and why Nazism prospered 
and found in him an adept and accomplice.
Albert Speer revealed a particular care and 
concern for Germany’s future, as a people and nation, by 
assuming the position that the responsibility for Nazism 
and the war was a collective responsibility of the leaders 
of the Nazi party, among which he included himself, not 
being in any way a collective responsibility of the German 
people. Despite stating that he “did not know” (which 
Calligaris considers a successful way of repression), Speer 
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still claimed his own responsibility for the horror that he 
claimed to not know about.
When trying to explain what happened, Speer 
argued that what happened would have been an effect 
of the development of modern technique, i.e., “the war 
was inevitable because it had the technical means for it” 
(Calligaris, 1991, p. 109). On this issue, Calligaris says 
that it is not enough to think that technical development is 
alienating and that it is not consistent to think that, if there 
are the technical means to wage war, this is inevitable. In 
order to explain what happened it would be necessary “to 
introduce something more into the conception of a specific 
form of alienation of the subject” (p. 109; emphasis of the 
author).
To corroborate this idea, Calligaris argues that one 
cannot think that the participation of Speer in Nazism could 
be justified by a concern regarding career or, on the other 
hand, that he had been a big sadist who found a specific 
form of pleasure in the idea that he was producing tools 
to kill. On the contrary, “he was a great family man, an 
educated and sensitive man, who would have been a great 
friend to us all” (Calligaris, 1991, p. 110).
According to this reasoning and the author’s 
hypothesis, when Speer defends the idea that what 
happened was a result of technical development, one could 
infer that what he calls the triumph of technique, of the 
instrumentality, is only a triumph to the extent that men 
work as an integral part of this technique, i.e., they act as 
instruments. The technique itself could not cause anything. 
Thus, it would not be the effect of the technique, but the 
“effect of human passion and interest in getting out of 
the banal neurotic suffering alienating the subjectivity, 
better yet, reducing the subjectivity to an instrumentality” 
(Calligaris, 1991, p. 110). Then we could talk about the 
“passion of being an instrument,” which could be read as 
the passion of being part of a gear, which would be the 
inertial trend of any neurotic person.
So, for Calligaris, the subject’s consent to turn 
him/herself into an established instrument of knowledge 
would be a kind of neurosis exit in terms of what he calls 
perversion. That would be priceless to the neurotic person; 
it would be an irresistible temptation. And he continues:
For an assembly of this kind to work, in which a 
subject turns into an instrument of a knowledge that 
orders him to eventually kill thousands of people, 
throw kids against a wall, burn a house full of people, 
this is a price that perhaps most neurotic people are 
willing to pay to find the relief that the perverse 
assembly promises. (Calligaris, 1991, p. 114)
Regarding this relief being an instrument of 
knowledge, Calligaris gives Rudolf Hoess as an example, 
commandant of Auschwitz concentration camp who, 
in his memoirs, wrote “I was an exemplary employee” 
as a justification and defense of his actions. For the 
psychoanalyst, this is not an easy excuse or an attempt to 
unload his responsibility, he would be really answering 
the question, because he was saying: “Your question is 
poorly formulated, because my pleasure was not killing 
people, my pleasure was being an exemplary employee, 
and, eventually, to become an exemplary employee, I was 
willing to kill people” (Calligaris, 1991, p. 114).
During the 1986 conference, Calligaris addressed 
this point by saying that “the issue is not the sadism of 
the torturer, otherwise we could never get out of this (we 
cannot conceive that half of Germany had been stuck in a 
sadistic phantasm of this kind)” (Calligaris, 1986, p. 10). 
Thus, it would be much easier for the neurotic person to 
enter a perverse assembly of this type than to stay at the 
neurotic conflict.
Calligaris considers unacceptable that, to exit the 
banal neurotic suffering through a perverse semblance, 
the neurotic person may consider that any price is good; to 
get the relief that the obedience of an exemplary employee 
provides, he would be willing to take any order. In this 
sense, returning to the concern of Albert Speer, the matter 
of responsibility should be placed very differently from 
how he wanted, because the responsibility cannot be taken 
only by the leaders, but by everyone who enjoyed the 
workings of Nazi Germany.
Hannah Arendt, German political philosopher 
of Jewish origin, wrote her first work, The Origins of 
Totalitarianism, at the end of the 1940s, which was first 
published in 1951. The work is divided into three parts – 
antisemitism, imperialism, and totalitarianism – and, in the 
latter, Arendt suggests that both Nazism and socialism are 
totalitarian ideologies. Among her theories, she talks about 
the trivialization of the terror and the participation of the 
masses in the consolidation of Nazism, on the same line of 
Calligaris’ thoughts.
A few years later, in 1963, Arendt wrote Eichmann 
in Jerusalem: a report on the banality of evil, based on the 
press coverage that documented the trial of Adolf Eichmann 
for the The New Yorker. In this book, she reports that 
the great exterminator of the Jews was not a devil (as the 
Jewish activists believed), but someone horribly normal. A 
typical bureaucrat who limited himself to following orders 
diligently.
In The Origins of Totalitarianism, Arendt (1951/1998) 
says it would be “an even more serious mistake to forget, 
because of this impermanence, that totalitarian regimes, as 
long as they are in power, and totalitarian leaders, so long 
as they are alive, command and rest upon mass support” 
(p. 356). Then, she complements stating that what is 
baffling in the success of totalitarianism is the devotion of 
its supporters or, in Calligaris’ terms, the easiness of paying 
any price to “exit the banal neurotic suffering alienating the 
subjectivity” (Calligaris, 1991, p. 110).
For Arendt, it is understandable that the convictions 
of a Nazi are not shaken by crimes committed against the 
enemies of the movement, but the amazing fact is that he 
(the subject taken in the assembly) did not waver even when 
“the monster starts devouring its own children, not even 
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when he himself becomes a victim of the oppression, when 
he is framed and convicted, when he is expelled from the 
party and sent to a concentration or a forced labor camp” 
(Arendt, 1951/1998, p. 357). In other words, there is a 
complete alienation of the subjectivity itself.
Then, through the examples described by Calligaris, 
we can see that perversion is inserted in the social field, 
in everyday life. Perversion would be something else, 
something other than a sexual deviation. Also, it would not 
even be something in the order of a deviation. In the social 
scope, it would be a kind of “choice.” We put the word 
choice between quotation marks because, often, it is not 
a conscious choice; it is about accepting another way out, 
another path. For Calligaris, the vast majority of people 
who enter a totalitarian system are taken in a perverse 
assembly, and a large part of neurotic people, when taken 
in a perverse assembly “consider that the benefits they take 
from that are priceless. It seems that they are ready for any 
dirt to remain in this assembly. But this is not only true for 
Nazism” (Calligaris, 1986, p. 12).
Perversion in the Witness Protection 
Program
Some points addressed by Calligaris can be included 
in other contexts. When the author says that this issue 
about the perverse assembly is not only true for Nazism, we 
immediately associate it with a professional experience as 
members of a technical team that accompanies witnesses 
in the Witness Protection Program – the Provita. By having 
worked directly with these witnesses for approximately 
three years, we realized certain aspects of what Queiroz 
and Calligaris say about perversion. Calligaris wrote about 
being locked in a perverse assembly that apparently offers 
many benefits to those who are part of it. We will use, in a 
few moments, the word Program to refer to Provita.
A brief background about the Witness Protection 
Program is necessary. The Provita was founded in 1996 
through the experience of the Gabinete de Assessoria 
Jurídica às Organizações Populares (GAJOP [Office of Legal 
Counsel to Popular Organizations])1 –, which contributed 
to the reduction of high levels of impunity in the state of 
Pernambuco. Three years later, the Protection Program was 
instituted by Federal Law No. 9,807/1999 and regulated by 
Decree No. 3.518/2000, with the aim of ensuring protection and 
assistance to people who were coerced or exposed to serious 
threat because they had cooperated with an investigation 
or prosecution. The Protection Program was created as a 
response to the necessity of preserving the witnesses of 
murders committed by police officers, extermination groups, 
or organized crime; today, the Program collaborates with 
the verification of several other crimes involving torture, 
slave labor, arms and human trafficking, drug trafficking, 
corruption, and electoral crimes.
1 The information about Provita’s history was found on the website 
<http://www.gajop.org.br> Accessed on October 10, 2014.
According to Silveira (2010), the Provita is one 
of the most important public policies, and it is structured 
on a National System, composed of a Federal Program of 
Assistance to the Victim and the Witness, and 19 State 
Programs. We believe that the existence of a Program of 
this type helps to reduce the levels of impunity, fighting 
the so­called “law of silence” and permeating the social 
imagination as a possibility of effective protection for 
those who decide, for various reasons, to collaborate with 
Justice. According to Silva (2008), the fear of reporting the 
occurrence of a crime and to testify is, undoubtedly, a factor 
that distances people from competent authorities, mainly 
as they are unaware of the existing protection mechanisms.
Applying these considerations to the terms that 
Calligaris proposes – about the perverse assembly – 
the difficulty of witnessing is also, in many cases, the 
difficulty of no longer participating in an assembly that 
offers assurance and, consequently, certain comfort. The 
people assisted by the Program are victims and/or witnesses 
of various types of crimes and criminal organizations, 
however, many (perhaps most) of the witnesses who join 
the Program are people who, somehow, were part of the 
criminal organization and who, for different reasons, 
decided to report it. There are few witnesses who simply 
were “in the wrong place at the wrong time”, and saw what 
they “should not have”. To be inserted in the Program, these 
witnesses are transferred to another city or state, which is 
not chosen by them, but by the staff of the Program based 
on risk mapping.
During these witnesses’ appointments, concerns 
arose about whether they were perverse subjects, consi­
dering that many of them had, in fact, committed crimes, 
participated in atrocities and had a peculiar relationship 
with the Law. However, what often transpires is that while 
they were involved in the “scheme” (in the assembly), 
everything was fine. They had a role in that gear, performed 
it with jurisdiction (i.e., were exemplary employees), they 
took advantage of it (whether financial, social status etc.), 
and provided benefits to one another, often standing out 
and being praised for their good work.
It is necessary to stress that those who come to the 
Program are hardly the leaders of the gear. On the contrary, 
they are employees. They are exemplary employees that, for 
various reasons, felt excluded or found themselves forced to 
exit the assembly. They are the horribly normal and banal 
subjects that Hannah Arendt detected. It is important to 
have this in mind because few decided to leave the scheme 
on their own accord. When Calligaris (1986) says that it 
is “much easier for the neurotic person to enter a perverse 
assembly of this type than stay at the neurotic conflict” 
(p. 11), that it is much easier to join a scheme instead of 
oscillating in conflicts of conscience, this is very clear in 
these cases. If it was up to some of these witnesses from the 
Program, they would have remained in the assembly. Most 
did not remain simply because something went wrong 
along the way. But the position they occupied until then 
seemed to be very comfortable.
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Gerald Shur, founder of the United States Federal 
Witness Protection Program, the WITSEC, wrote a book, 
with Pete Earley – investigative journalist – in which he 
tells of his Foundation experience with the Program and 
follow­up of witnesses, many of them former members 
of the Mob. He mentions enough data and information to 
convince us of how hard it is to exit a perverse assembly, 
and that these witnesses only left for extreme reasons or 
when they saw no other choice. “I had no illusions about 
the reasons why they were helping the government. Some 
felt that they had done a good deal. Most knew that it was 
the only chance to stay alive. Others wanted to take revenge 
on their former partners” (Earley & Shur, 2002, p. 420).
One of the cases, which the interdisciplinary 
technical staff (psychologist, social worker, and lawyer) 
accompanied in the Provita that we worked for, is similar 
to some aspects that Calligaris described about Nazism. 
After reading about the case for the first time, the staff was 
shocked by the amount of crimes that this witness helped 
commit, never directly, but working as a key part so that 
everything worked as it should. For example, one witness 
used to drive cars for escapes, carrying bodies to “dump 
them”, kept secrets about political schemes etc.
When we met this witness in person, everyone 
on the staff felt baffled. He was not a sadistic person, he 
had not enjoyed participating in the crimes, but the gear 
simply worked very well, and he was part of it. Following 
our coexistence with this guy and his family, we were able 
to realize that he was a devoted father and husband, and a 
very dear neighbor in the community in which he started 
living.
John Partington is one of the first federal agents 
(U.S. Marshals) in the United States to ever work in 
WITSEC. In 2010, along with Arlene Violet (lawyer of 
the Federal Government), Partington published a book 
that tells of their work experiences protecting witnesses 
of WITSEC; many of whom were part of the Mob. In an 
excerpt of the book, he reports experiences similar to what 
we went through.
When I started to be part of the lives of Mob 
members, I realized that these men had a code 
of honor. They were not 100% bad [...] Raymond 
Patriarca had a good side. For example, when a boy 
in the neighborhood lost an eye, Patriarca made 
sure he had the best doctors in the country and paid 
the costs of all the necessary care. (Partington & 
Violet, 2010, p. 8)
A little further, he reports, in detail, how he 
accompanied Joe Barboza (known as “The Animal”), the 
witness who was directly denouncing Raymond Patriarca, 
the leader of the Mob. He says: “We talked about how our 
lives could have been different if we had made other choices. 
He was as cold as they usually are, he could kill me in the 
blink of an eye, but, on the other hand, he wrote poetry and 
loved his daughter” (Partington & Violet, 2010, p. 28).
Shur reports something about talking to the 
witnesses he accompanied:
I remember arriving at a prison unit, in which we 
kept the most difficult criminals in the Program, 
and finding many of them sitting on the floor 
making posters with cartoon characters for children 
from hospitals. Most of these men were murderers 
and, still, they prided themselves on their work for 
the children. (Earley & Shur, 2002, p. 420)
In short, many of these witnesses were common 
people, perhaps even neurotic people who “chose” per­
version, because it is so seductive. Hannah Arendt, in her 
terms, writes about what we understand by seduction of 
the neurosis exit through perversion: “The attraction 
of evil and crime for the mob mentality is nothing new. 
It has always been true that the mob will greet deeds of 
violence with the admiring remark: it may be mean but it 
is very clever” (Arendt, 1951/1998, p. 356). Arendt, here, 
uses the word “mob” to refer to the masses, to ordinary and 
common people.
To guide our questions we tried to think about the 
Witness Protection Program as a sort of device that could 
make possible the exit of neurotic people from the perverse 
assembly in which they are inserted. Some, in fact, never 
exit, the chiefs and leaders, for example. Maybe they are 
perverse in their structure, those who would never exit 
the gear, the smart ones, those supposedly safe from any 
danger.
During the appointments conducted with the 
witnesses from Provita, we noticed aspects similar to 
those that Queiroz (2004) and Calligaris (1986) pointed out 
regarding the position of the analyst while listening to a 
subject, a patient with a discourse that shows perverse traits. 
The place of Psychology in the Program (as an institution) 
did not allow for a simultaneous existence with the place 
of Psychology with the witnesses. Thus, it was necessary 
to refer them to other psychologists and psychoanalysts, 
outside the Program, when there was demand for some 
kind of psychological and psychotherapeutic support 
or psychoanalytic follow­up. However, the contact of 
the psychologists from the Program was very frequent 
and direct with the witnesses and their families, which, 
inevitably, turned into long hours of conversation 
throughout the whole protection period.
During these conversations, we noticed a particular 
type of discourse, addressed to the Program; resembling 
the discourse reported by Queiroz. We stress that this 
resemblance, obviously, did not concern the discursive 
content, but “the way of reporting it, i.e., the discursive phe­
nomenology, was a difficult to register fact” (Queiroz, 
2004, p. 60, our emphasis).
In regards to this report, Queiroz (2004) evokes an 
imagery discourse, whose purpose would be to see and 
show through words. She points out that “the language 
appears to be merely denotative, loaded with hyperbolic 
Psicologia USP   I   www.scielo.br/pusp10
Juliana Falcão Barbosa & Charles Elias Lang
10
descriptions that give the narrative a unique texture” (p. 30). 
Thus, having in mind some of the similarities we perceived 
among the discourses, we can highlight: the challenge 
(the analyst and, similarly, the staff of the Program); the 
imagery and denotative discourse (in relation to situations 
that needed protection, situations with “heavy” content); 
the position of superiority regarding knowledge.
The denotative feature and imagery discourse gives 
a more impoverished tone to the discourse, because it ends 
up being restrict to the description of the events, usually in 
a very detailed mode, but without representation. Often the 
many “heavy” details were intended to shock the listener 
(in this case, the analyst or the technical team). Queiroz 
(2004) wrote that, in this context, the signifier is engaged 
in the act of representing. When talking about a specific 
patient, the author says that any intervention towards the 
search for meaning seemed not to echo, the reports of the 
experiences were repeated as mere description of facts.
We found the same in the discourses of some 
witnesses from the Program. What they were talking 
about was closer to the description of facts and often no 
one sought to make sense of that experience. This becomes 
understandable if we consider, on the one hand, that the 
actual condition of a “witness” boils down to narrating 
facts. Testifying is something completely different from 
narrating or making a confession. When a witness is before 
a judge, what matters is what he saw, heard, the details. 
That is, something that is more related to the sensory­
perceptual and cognitive field (what he saw or heard) than 
to the subjectivity. Obviously the judge is not interested, it 
is not part of the protocol, in asking how the witness felt, 
which was his position regarding the facts, the place from 
where he spoke, etc.
One of Queiroz’s patients, for example, complained 
constantly of the analyst­analysand relationship, defined by 
him in terms of authoritarianism and asymmetry. She says 
that sometimes his purpose was to reverse the places, which 
promoted an impasse. Later, when talking about this double 
movement, she says that the analysand believed he should 
undergo the analyst’s knowledge, “giving himself as an 
offering, at the same time he got deeply angry, and sought 
ways to reverse the situation.” (Queiroz, 2004, p. 68).
We also noted this double movement in the Witness 
Protection Program. The witness, in giving himself to the 
Other (in this case to the State, the Law, the Program), 
constantly tries to challenge it, transgress it. He questions 
the unequal position, lived as a disadvantage for him. Then, 
he puts himself in the position of he who holds the power 
and knowledge, with phrases such as: “the Justice needs 
my testimony”; “it is just because of me you have your 
job”; “the Program needs witnesses to exist”. Meanwhile, 
at the same time, he knows he is in the vulnerable position 
of needing special protection, for not being able to protect 
himself and because the Program became the last solution, 
the last resort.
In fact, the position is uneven, asymmetrical. As 
it is in the analysis. The Program uses aliases, fictitious 
names for both the witnesses and the people of the staff, 
responsible for the protection. The difference is that the 
staff knows the real name of the witness, while the witness 
does not know the true identity of the staff. In addition to 
the name, the staff knows many details of the witness’ life, 
while the witness knows almost nothing about the staff, not 
even where the headquarters of the Program is. Similarly, 
the analyst knows details of the patient’s life, feelings, and 
desires, in general, the most intimate ones, those that no 
one else knows, while the patient has restricted access to 
the analyst’s personal life.
Although the purpose of the Program is to protect 
witnesses, distancing them from the crime and their 
partners, their own entrance into the Program, is under the 
threat of another kind of perverse assembly. This refers, 
firstly, to anonymity, taking anonymity as a way not to 
take responsibility for what is said or done. The issue of 
anonymity is a striking feature of the perverse operation 
and, when entering the Program, for their own protection, 
the witnesses must remain anonymous. This requires 
that the witness avoid performing any kind of national 
registration/record, in the place of protection, given the 
risk of being tracked by his/her perpetrators. The witness 
is placed in a position nearly outside the symbolic, almost 
foreclosed, and his access to the symbolic is mediated by 
a fictitious name and by a staff. In addition, the witnesses 
have to create a cover story regarding the details of their 
lives, their cities of origin, the reasons for the change of city, 
their former lives. They need to invent a fictitious story. For 
having revealed a secret (information about a crime and the 
people responsible), they needed to be secreted from their 
place of origin, they had to be segregated. Thus, they need 
to live secreted lives, in secret, elsewhere.
For the witnesses in the Program, secrecy is an 
essential condition for staying under protection. After 
joining, they sign a Commitment Letter, through which 
they agree to maintain absolute confidentiality about 
everything related to the Program and the information 
about their early life that may compromise their security.
These agreements allow the subject to entry a new 
perverse assembly, because we know that the anonymity, 
although distressing for many people, is also a way of not 
taking responsibility for acts and words. It is a way of 
making wishes come true without having to pay the price 
for it. There are even cases of witnesses who entered the 
Program asking for a legal name change (which rarely 
happens in Brazil), so they could continue committing 
crimes, with a new identity, erasing their previous history. 
Thus, the new crimes could be committed by a sort of alter 
ego, an alternate ego.
Mario Fleig, in his book O Desejo Perverso, 
talks about some distinct characteristics of the perverse 
functioning and, among them, the anonymity.
It is not for nothing that a number of perverse 
tendencies are called “a desire that dare not speak 
its name” (Lacan). . . . It is the anonymity, the 
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clandestine place, the action that is not enough 
to implement the passage by the authentication 
in the Other (Fleig, 2008, p. 71, emphasis added by 
the author).
Gerald Shur reported this difficulty with the 
anonymity issue, in regards to the new identity of the 
witnesses. In the United States the change of legal identity 
always happens. “In its first decade of operation, witnesses 
from WITSEC committed 12 murders after they were 
relocated to other cities. Others used their new identities 
to avoid creditors and steal millions of dollars through new 
frauds and schemes” (Earley & Shur, 2002, p. 8).
Many of these witnesses seem to always, whatever 
the situation, put themselves (or end up) in the position of 
an instrument. In both situations – before and after entering 
the Program – they are objects, pieces in the gear. Before 
entering, they are the key element in the perverse assembly 
and, after entering the Program, they are the key element 
in the scheme.
During the 1986 conference, Calligaris was asked 
whether the tendency to belong to a group, an institution, 
and to be recognized by it, would not be in some ways a 
perverse attitude. His answer was yes, he also said that 
perhaps life is not possible without the perverse assembly. 
He gives the psychoanalytic institutions and associations 
of fishermen as examples, in which this assembly would be 
quite innocent. “The problem is that the perverse assembly 
goes much further” (Calligaris, 1986, p. 12).
In the case of these witnesses with whom we worked 
– those who were part of the group who were denouncing 
– there is a perverse pact, as one could call a win­win 
situation, that is, a situation in which both parties win. It 
is as if Justice said to the witness: “By law, you should be 
arrested. And by your law, you should not denounce your 
partners. But, through our pact, you help me and I help you. 
I let you go (or reduce your time) and give you protection 
and, in return, you tell me what you were doing, how you 
were doing it, and who was involved.” It was with this kind 
of pact that many families in the Mob began to break their 
silence, the so­called omertà. As Partington and Violet 
(2010) tell in their book: “We are protecting the bad guys, 
so we can get the worst guys” (p. 27).
Returning to the question about the characteristics 
of the perverse discourse, Queiroz (2004), when talking 
about the repetition of lines as a mere description of facts, 
says that “every analysis begins when the need to tell runs 
out” (p. 54). We can perceive something similar, in some 
cases, with the witnesses from the Program. Sometimes 
after some time being protected in another city, away 
from the crime scene, they seem to overcome the phase of 
“descriptions”, as they come to the Program after having 
repeated the facts that led to their inclusion many times, 
the crime, etc.
In certain cases we see that, after some time, the 
witnesses – for the first time – begin to question, they 
question their role, their position in the whole story and, 
sometimes, they even show interest in having a different 
life or learning to live with uncertainty and limits. While 
they were taken in the perverse assembly, many of these 
witnesses lived in an organization as if there were no limits, 
nothing that could stop them. On the other hand, when 
entering the Program, everything that they experience 
are uncertainties and limitations. There are uncertainties 
of various types: they do not know beforehand where 
they will live; in which city; whether it will be a house or 
apartment; who they will meet; which way the process will 
go; if the perpetrators will be arrested or not; if some day 
they will feel safe or if they will be threatened again. There 
are no guarantees in any way.
Silva (2008) gives an explanation about what their 
aim is regarding the witnesses protected by the Program. 
For them, it is expected that these subjects can build new 
relationships in a new territory with the intention that, 
through them, they can put down roots and build new life 
projects that enable them to enhance their own autonomy, 
strengthening bonds, in such a way that they no longer 
return to the crime scene or other areas of risk.
Final considerations 
We believe that one of the main – and also most 
difficult – purposes of the technical team from Provita, 
which deals directly with the witnesses, is trying to help 
them to live and face the uncertainties, the faults, which 
used to be filled by the perverse assemblies, by perverse 
leaders, or by situations outside the law.
In this sense, we agree with Elia (2010) who, in his 
elaborations on the work with psychoanalysis at institutions, 
says that psychoanalysis opens up possibilities to work 
with subjects inserted within institutions. According to 
him: “In these institutions, the axis of an analytical work 
can be pinched, since it is oriented by the listening to what 
precisely makes it arise as a subject, without disregarding 
all social factors present in the concrete reality of these 
subjects” (Elia, 2010, p. 144). Thus, we think that in addition 
to helping the witness to be reinserted socially in a new 
city, the team’s work can also help the subject to deal with 
faults and uncertainties. Maybe some work can be done in 
order to allow a passage, the renewal of the neurotic person 
who was stuck in a perverse assembly, a way out of these 
assemblies and towards other possibilities that can create a 
social bond.
At the end of the 1986 conference, there was a direct 
question made, to which Calligaris relates the concept of 
perversion: “So, is perversion a social bond? Yes or no?”. 
His answer is yes, and that perversion must be the social 
bond in the common sense of the social bond – that is, 
what makes people relate. It is, in fact, very noticeable that 
perversion (or the perverse assembly) makes people relate 
to each other. Everyday life is filled with perverse acts and 
pacts. These pacts are those in which both parties win at the 
expense of a third party, in which for one to win the other 
has to lose, etc. Again, we are not talking about perversion 
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as a structure, but as perverse formations, formations that 
allow the constitution of social bonds. Thus, for Calligaris 
(1986), our everyday social bond is a perverse assembly, 
even if there was no perverse structure. For him, two 
neurotic people are enough for a perverse assembly.
The authors on whom we base our work – Calligaris 
and Queiroz – helped us to consider perversion as part 
of the human condition and to keep it away from both 
its strictly sexual and moral connotations. Calligaris 
approaches some perverse aspects, pointing to a neurosis 
exit through perversion, emphasizing the ease with which 
neurotic people are often trapped in perverse assemblies. 
Queiroz helped us to reconsider the widely held idea that a 
perverse person does not seek analysis, or does not remain 
in analysis.
Calligaris and Queiroz, while uniting the social 
analysis and perverse discourse analysis at the clinic, help 
to deconstruct a notion that perversion would be something 
exceptional, out of the norm, abnormal or deviant, as the 
etymology of the word perversion indicates. The dialogue 
with these texts also awakened us to the realization 
of another reading of the work, performed along with 
Provita. The reading that we intended here can be useful 
to clinicians and the social and institutional analysts, as 
well as to professionals who work with the witnesses of the 
Program to help us understand these witnesses as subjects 
that may have been taken by perverse assemblies. If these 
subjects are taken by these assemblies, therefore, they can 
get out of them, some of them with the help of the Program, 
as a device capable of starting this exit.
Vidas secretadas: notas sobre a perversão no Programa de Proteção a Testemunhas
Resumo: Este artigo aborda a perversão no campo social e na clínica, compreendendo a clínica como uma área de investigação 
através da qual se pode ter acesso aos fenômenos sociais e aos discursos dominantes. Trabalha-se com a pesquisa em psicanálise, 
optando-se por dialogar fundamentalmente com leituras de dois autores – Contardo Calligaris e Edilene Queiroz – que partem 
de suas experiências na clínica psicanalítica para tecer análises sobre o social. Tomando um texto de Calligaris, intitulado 
“A sedução totalitária” (1991), juntamente com o livro A clínica da perversão (2004) de Queiroz, procura-se entrelaçá-los, tendo 
como fio condutor uma experiência profissional no Programa de Proteção a Vítimas e Testemunhas Ameaçadas (Provita). Alguns 
conceitos psicanalíticos utilizados neste estudo são: a estrutura, o discurso e a montagem perversa, como pontos nodais da 
análise clínica e social. A experiência de trabalho com testemunhas inseridas no Provita possibilitou algumas associações com 
aspectos concernentes ao campo da perversão.
Palavras-chave: perversão, clínica, social, Programa de Proteção a Testemunhas.
Vies sécrétées: notes sur la perversion dans le Programme de Protection de Témoins
Résumé: Cet article adresse la perversion dans le champ social et dans la clinique, y compris la clinique comme étant une zone 
d’investigation à travers duquel il est possible d’avoir accès aux phénomènes sociaux et aux discours dominants. On travaille 
avec la recherche dans la psychanalyse, avec l’option de dialoguer principalement avec deux auteurs – Contardo Calligaris 
et Edilene Queiroz – qui partagent ses expériences dans la clinique psychanalytique afin de créer des analyses sur le social. 
En utilisant un texte de Calligaris, intitulé “La seduction totalitaire” (1991), et le titre « La clinique de la perversion » (2004) de 
Queiroz, on cherche les combiner, ayant comme fil conducteur l’expérience professionnel dans le Programme de Protection de 
la Victime et Témoins Menacés. Quelques concepts psychanalytiques utilisés dans cette étude sont: la structure, le discours et 
le montage pervers, comme étant des points modaux de l’analyse critique et sociale. L’expérience de travail avec les témoins 
insérés dans le Provita a permis l’association avec des aspects concernant le champ de la perversion.
Mots-clés: perversion, clinique, social, Programme de Protection à la Temoin.
Vidas ocultas: apuntes sobre la perversión en el Programa de Protección a Testigos
Resumen: El presente plantea la perversión en el campo social y en la clínica, comprendiendo la clínica como un área de 
investigación a través de la cual se puede acceder a los fenómenos sociales y a los discursos dominantes. Se trabaja con la 
investigación en psicoanálisis, optando por dialogar fundamentalmente con lecturas de dos autores – Contardo Calligaris y 
Edilene Queiroz – quienes parten de sus experiencias en la clínica psicoanalítica para tejer análisis sobre el social. Considerando 
el texto de Calligaris, titulado La seducción totalitaria (1991), junto con el libro La clínica de la perversión (2004) de Queiroz, se 
intenta entrelazarles, con el hilo conductor de la experiencia profesional en el Programa de Protección de Víctimas y Testigos 
amenazado. Algunos conceptos psicoanalíticos utilizados en este estudio son: la estructura, el discurso y el montaje perverso 
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como los nudos del análisis clínico y social. La experiencia de trabajar con testigos insertados en el Provita hizo posible 
asociaciones con aspectos relativos al campo de la perversión.
Palabras clave: perversión, clínica, social, Programa de Protección a Testigos.
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